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Abstract— The development of robotics and AI agents has
enabled their wider usage in human surroundings. AI agents
are more trusted to make increasingly important decisions with
potentially critical outcomes. It is essential to consider the
ethical consequences of the decisions made by these systems. In
this paper, we present how contrastive explanations can be used
for comparing the ethics of plans. We build upon an existing
ethical framework to allow users to make suggestions about
plans and receive contrastive explanations.
I. INTRODUCTION
AI Planning systems, referred to as planners, are used in a
variety of complex domains to create a sequence of actions
known as a plan to achieve a set of goals from an initial state.
We are interested in models where actions are deterministic,
durationless, and can be performed one at a time. We also
assume a known initial state and goal. Traditionally, ethical
principles of single decisions are evaluated [1]. In the context
of AI Planning this means analysing a massive number of
isolated decisions that may not make sense without the
context in which they are being made. Therefore, it is
preferable to evaluate the ethical contents of a plan as a
whole. Lindner et al. [2] describe an approach to judging
the ethical outcomes of an entire plan. We build upon their
work by providing contrastive explanations [3], [4] to allow
users to understand the ethics of plans.
We use as a running example the following ethical
dilemma. A robot has been charged with the care of an
elderly gentleman named Frank (Fig. 1). Frank has grown
quite fond of the robot. The robot wants to motivate Frank
so that he will do some exercise and keep healthy. The
robot has two choices, it can either beg Frank to exercise,
or it can lie. The robot can deceive Frank, exploiting the
affection that Frank has for him, by telling Frank that he
will be decommissioned if it cannot keep Frank healthy. A
moderator is examining the robot’s behaviour and trying to
understand the ethics of the plans produced, to ensure the
plan is adhering to the moderator’s moral principles. Frank
being healthy, has a positive utility and a positive effect on
Frank, while Frank being unhealthy has a negative effect
on him. The action of begging Frank is intrinsically neutral,
while the action of lying to Frank is intrinsically bad.
Evaluating the ethics of individual plans is necessary for
the integration of AI systems in everyday use. However, it
is not enough to pass judgement on automated plans. Users
should be able to make suggestions, when they suspect the
system could behave more ethically, to produce alternative
plans and compare the moralities of each.
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Fig. 1. Motivating scene from the movie ”Robot & Frank”. Snapshot is
taken from the same movie.
This can be done through contrastive explanations [5],
which focus on explaining the difference between a factual
event A and a contrasting event B. To produce these explana-
tions, one must reason about the hypothetical alternative B,
which likely means constructing an alternative plan where B
is included rather than A. The original model is constrained
to produce a hypothetical planning model (HModel). The
solution to the HModel is the hypothetical plan (HPlan) that
contains the contrast case expected by the user.
The plans are then tested under the user’s chosen ethical
principle, and explanations are generated. A contrastive ex-
planation is generated to show the difference in the moral
permissibility of the plan and HPlan [6], [7].
Our proposed approach can be implemented as a service
– i.e., as a wrapper around an existing planning system that
takes as input the current planning problem and domain
model, the current plan, and the user’s suggestion and ethical
principle. It can invoke the existing planning system on
hypothetical problems which satisfy the user’s suggestions.
This approach allows users to get explanations constructed
from their own trusted planner and model. This can alleviate
concerns over the ethical behaviour of external systems.
II. MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF PLANS
Researchers in ethics have proposed various ethical theo-
ries offering different ethical principles according to which
the moral permissibility of actions can be judged: consequen-
tialist theories judge actions based on their consequences,
deontological theories judge actions based on their intrinsic
value, by their intentions or means, and hybrid theories, such
as the principle of double effect, combine consequentialism
and deontology. Lindner et al. [2] present an approach to
checking the moral permissibility of action plans according
to a collection of moral principles 1. The approach is based
on the idea that moral permissibility checking can be reduced
to model checking. Formulae that can be evaluated over
action plans capture the meaning of the respective ethical
1We provide explanations for all principles discussed in Lindnder et al. [2]
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theory. For example, the formula φ =
∧
a∈Pi ¬Bad(a)
captures the deontological rule that none of the actions in
a plan may be intrinsically bad. We use prime implicate
generation methods to find sufficient and necessary reasons
for φ to become true or false [8]. In the Robot & Frank
case, lying is intrinsically bad. Thus, φ is false for every
plan that involves lying. The prime implicate Bad(lying) is a
sufficient and necessary reason for ¬φ and hence explains the
moral impermissibility of such a plan. We use a framework
for explanation construction based on this approach which
we refer to as the Ethical Explanation Generator.
III. CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATIONS
A plan produced by an AI agent may not adhere to the
ethical principles of a human moderator. The moderator may
have insight on how to improve the ethical outcome of the
plan, but not have the ability to evaluate their prediction. To
this end, we allow a human-in-the-loop to suggest improve-
ments in the plan. The AI agent can plan accordingly for
these suggestions and explain to the user how the original
and new plans differ ethically. Contrastive explanations are
naturally useful for comparison [9]. Therefore, we believe
contrastive explanations are instrumental in comparing the
ethical outcomes of plans, allowing users to better understand
the ethics of plans produced by planning systems.
Definition 1. An explanation problem is a tuple E =
〈Π, φ, σ, 〉, in which Π is a planning model, φ is the plan
generated by the planner, σ is the suggestion given by the
user, and  is the ethical principle.
The ability to reason about what would happen in the
contrast cases suggested by the user is essential to compare
the ethical outcomes of plans. We approach the problem in
Definition 1 by generating plans for the contrast cases via
compilations which enforce the moderator’s suggestion.
A compilation of a planning instance defined by the
planning model Π is shown as Compilation(Π, σ) = Π′
where σ is the suggestion 2. The compilation process derives
constraints from the suggestion σ which enforces the user’s
suggestion and produces a new planning model Π′. We call
Π′ the hypothetical model, or HModel. However, Π′ can also
be used as the input model so that the user can iteratively
suggest improvements to a plan produced by some model, i.e
Compilation(Compilation(Π, σ), σ′). After the HModel is
formed, it is solved with the original planner to give the
HPlan φ′. For each iteration of compilation, the HPlan is
validated against the original model Π to ensure that the
plan suggested by the moderator is also applicable in the
current situation. An explanation for the permissibility of
the both plans φ and φ′ under  is formed from the Ethical
Explanation Generator. A contrastive explanation highlights
the differences between φ and φ′, and therefore sheds light
on the consequence of the user’s suggestion. This process is
visualised in Fig. 2.
In our example, the robot may lie to Frank to motivate
him to work out and stay healthy. The moderator might
2Krarup et al. [4] provides a full formalisation of all the compilations
used.
Fig. 2. Architecture diagram for the implemented system which provides
contrastive explanations of the ethics of plans
wonder about the ethical reasoning behind this decision.
Before he passes judgement, the moderator wants to compare
the ethical outcome of lying to Frank with the original plan of
begging Frank to exercise. This forces the planner to perform
the action beg Frank to achieve the goal and restricts the
model from performing the action lie to Frank. The HPlan
produced from the HModel is now one where the robot begs
Frank to exercise. The plan and HPlan are then inputted to
the Ethical Explanation Generator, along with the ethical
principle chosen by the moderator, in this case the deon-
tological principle. This produces two causal explanations
Bad(lying to Frank) and ¬Bad(begging Frank). We combine
these explanations to produce a natural language contrastive
explanation: ”The original plan is impermissible because
lying to Frank is bad, whereas the HPlan is permissible
because begging Frank is not bad”.
IV. CONCLUSION
We implemented a system for providing contrasting ex-
planations for comparing the ethical outcomes of plans 3. In
the future, we will conduct user studies to test our approach
and verify our assumption that contrastive explanations are
useful for users to understand the ethics of plan. Finally,
we will evaluate whether this process helps to evolve the
trust the user has in the system to produce ethical plans for
autonomous robots.
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